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Non-technical summary 
 
Germany’s 2005 welfare reform introduced two competing organizational systems for the 
administration and activation of welfare recipients. In the majority of the 439 German districts, a 
centralized organization was established where local employment offices and local authorities had to 
form a joint venture which is subject to the central directives and guidelines of the Federal 
Employment Agency (FEA). Within the joint venture, the FEA is in charge of the administration of 
benefits, job placement and the application of the main instruments of active labor market policy. The 
local authorities have the task to administer payments for housing costs and special needs. Moreover, 
they provide counseling in case of specific contexts such as lone parent status, home care for elderly or 
disabled relatives, or addiction to alcohol and drugs.  
 
In a policy experiment, 69 out of the 439 districts were allowed to opt out for a decentralized 
organization of welfare administration. In the decentralized agencies the local authorities 
autonomously organize welfare administration. They are responsible for the entire activation process, 
including counseling, the disbursement of benefits, job placement and the allocation of benefit 
recipients to active labor market policy programs. Thus, the FEA is not involved and decentralized 
welfare agencies can decide on their own on how to activate the welfare recipients. The decentralized 
welfare agencies are legally and organizationally independent from central directives and guidelines. 
All other components of public welfare and labor market policy – such as benefit entitlements, the tax-
benefit system in general, and labor market institutions such as minimum wages and employment 
protection – apply equally to the centralized and the decentralized system of welfare administration. 
 
In this paper we evaluate the relative success of both systems. Our empirical analysis is based on a 
unique data set compiled from in-depths surveys of welfare administration, register data of the FEA, 
comprehensive surveys of welfare recipients and extensive regional information. The data contain 
information on organizational and strategic features of welfare agencies which is usually unavailable. 
They contain information about a sample of individuals who received welfare benefits in October 
2006 and who are followed until December 2007. 
 
We find that decentralized welfare administration has a negative effect on the chances of male welfare 
recipients to take up employment providing a sufficient living income and leading to exit from welfare 
receipt. Given the low transition intensity from welfare receipt into employment in general, the 
magnitudes of the effects are substantial. Compared with centralized welfare agencies, the integration 
rate of decentralized welfare agencies is up to 25 percent lower during the observation period. For 
women, we also find negative effects, which are, however, statistically insignificant. No significant 
differences are found when considering employment with supplementary welfare receipt as the 
outcome. Based on these results, we conclude that centralized standards and routines work effectively 
for individuals without further obstacles to employment. Once additional problems, such as a lack of 
child care facilities, come into play, standardized placement loses its effectiveness. In particular, tailor-
made solutions to individual needs often require the cooperation of local actors. This is why, in our 
opinion, the centralized model has no significant advantage over the decentralized model in case of 
female welfare recipients. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Vor der Umsetzung der so genannten Hartz IV-Reform im Januar 2005 bestand keine politische 
Einigkeit darüber, wer für die Betreuung und arbeitsmarktpolitische Aktivierung von erwerbsfähigen 
Hilfebedürftigen zuständig sein sollte. In einer Kompromisslösung wurden daher zwei verschiedene 
Organisationsmodelle – sogenannte Arbeitsgemeinschaften (ARGEn) und zugelassene kommunale 
Träger (zkT) – parallel nebeneinander eingeführt, um ihren relativen Erfolg im gegenseitigen 
Wettbewerb zu bestimmen und das erfolgreichere Modell später flächendeckend umzusetzen. 
 
In der Mehrheit der 439 Kreise und kreisfreien Städte wurde eine ARGE aus Agentur für Arbeit und 
Kommune gegründet. Beide Institutionen betreuen in der ARGE die erwerbsfähigen Hilfebedürftigen 
gemeinschaftlich. Die Agenturen für Arbeit sind dabei zuständig für die Verwaltung und Auszahlung 
der Regelleistung des Arbeitslosengelds II, die Aktivierung der Hilfebedürftigen mit 
arbeitsmarktpolitischen Maßnahmen und ihrer Vermittlung in Arbeit. Die Kommunen sind 
verantwortlich für die Leistungen für Unterkunft und Heizung, eventuelle Mehrbedarfe beim 
Lebensunterhalt sowie für die Beratung bei besonderen Problemlagen. Charakteristisch für 
Arbeitsgemeinschaften ist, dass Weisungen der Bundesagentur für Arbeit (BA), z.B. im Hinblick auf 
den Einsatz von arbeitsmarktpolitischen Maßnahmen, bindend sind. Die ARGEn stehen daher unter 
dem direkten Einfluss der BA und können somit auch als zentralisierte Organisationseinheiten bzw. 
zentralisierte Jobcenter verstanden werden. 
 
69 Kreisen und kreisfreien Städten wurde hingegen gestattet, die Betreuung von erwerbsfähigen 
Hilfebedürftigen dezentral zu organisieren. In diesen zugelassenen kommunalen Trägern ist allein die 
Kommune verantwortlich für sämtliche Aktivierungs-, Vermittlungs- und Beratungsaufgaben; die 
Agenturen für Arbeit und somit die BA sind nicht eingeschaltet. Die zugelassenen kommunalen 
Träger unterstehen keinen zentralen Vorgaben, sondern können den Wiedereingliederungsprozess von 
Hilfebedürftigen in den Arbeitsmarkt ihren eigenen Vorstellungen entsprechend gestalten. 
 
Die vorliegende Studie untersucht den relativen Erfolg beider Organisationsmodelle. Dazu verwenden 
wir einen Datensatz, der eigens für diese Untersuchung konzipiert wurde. Dieser Datensatz setzt sich 
zusammen aus umfangreichen Erhebungen auf Ebene der Jobcenter, administrativen Daten der BA, 
einer Befragung von mehr als 20.000 Arbeitslosengeld II-Empfängern und zahlreichen regionalen 
Informationen. Die Daten beziehen sich auf die Jahre 2006 und 2007 und beinhalten eine Stichprobe 
von Personen, die im Oktober 2006 Arbeitslosengeld II bezogen haben und deren Werdegang im 
Anschluss bis Dezember 2007 verfolgt werden kann. 
  
Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass eine dezentralisierte Organisation bei hilfebedürftigen Männern einen 
substantiell negativen Effekt auf deren Chancen hat, eine bedarfsdeckende Beschäftigung 
aufzunehmen, also eine Beschäftigung, die ein ausreichendes Einkommen generiert, um den ALG II-
Leistungsbezug zu verlassen. Zugelassene kommunale Träger erzielen in Bezug auf diesen 
Ergebnisindikator während des Beobachtungszeitraums eine bis zu 25% geringere Integrationsrate als 
Arbeitsgemeinschaften. Auch für Frauen lässt sich tendenziell ein negativer Effekt feststellen. Dieser 
ist jedoch nicht statistisch signifikant. Ebenso lassen sich keine signifikanten Unterschiede erkennen, 
wenn Beschäftigung mit anhaltendem Leistungsbezug als Ergebnisindikator verwendet wird. 
 
Wir schlussfolgern aus diesen Ergebnissen, dass zentralisierte Jobcenter bzw. ARGEn dann 
erfolgreicher in der Arbeitsmarktintegration sind, wenn keine Vermittlungshemmnisse bestehen. 
Liegen solche vor, wie bspw. bei einem unzureichenden Angebot an Kinderbetreuung, verlieren 
standardisierte Vermittlungskonzepte im Rahmen der zentralisierten Aufgabenwahrnehmung ihren 
Effektivitätsvorsprung. Um bei Vermittlungshemmnissen eine passgenaue Lösung für jeden Einzelfall 
sicherzustellen, ist eine enge Abstimmung mit lokalen Kooperationspartnern notwendig. Diese kann 
sowohl durch Arbeitsgemeinschaften als auch zugelassene kommunale Träger in gleichem Ausmaß 
gewährt werden. Dies mag auch erklären, warum sich keine signifikanten Unterschiede zwischen 
beiden Organisationsmodellen für Frauen erkennen lassen. 
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Abstract 
The 2005 reform of the German welfare system introduced two competing organizational 
models for welfare administration. In most districts, a centralized organization was estab-
lished where local welfare agencies are bound to central directives. At the same time, 69 dis-
tricts were allowed to opt for a decentralized organization. We evaluate the relative success of 
both types of organizations. Compared to centralized organization, decentralized organization 
of welfare administration has a negative effect on the transition of male welfare recipients to 
self-sufficient employment, but it does not affect employment in combination with continuing 
welfare support. No significant effects were found for women.  
 
JEL-Codes: I38, J64, C31 
Key Words: Welfare System, Organization, Decentralization, Labor Market Integration 
 
Acknowledgements: This study is based on results from the evaluation mandated by the “experimen-
tation clause” of Section 6a of Book II of the German Social Code and was commissioned by the 
German Parliament. All opinions expressed are our own. We wish to thank the Institute for Employ-
ment Research (IAB), Nürnberg, for providing the administrative data for this study. We gratefully 
acknowledge the helpful comments of Martin Brussig, Bernd Fitzenberger, Matthias Knuth, Michael 
Lechner and Conny Wunsch. We wish to thank Markus Clauss and Martina Hartig for helping us to 
obtain the database. Moritz Hennig, Stefan Langer, Verena Niepel and Hans Verbeek provided excel-
lent research assistance.  
 
* Corresponding author. Institute for Applied Economic Research (IAW), Ob dem Himmelreich 1, D-
72074 Tübingen, Tel. (Fax): +49-7071-989620 (-989699), Email: bernhard.boockmann@iaw.edu 
§ University of Tübingen; † IZA, Bonn; ¶ Otto-von-Guericke University, Magdeburg; 
$ Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim; # University of St. Gallen 
1  Introduction 
The organization of public welfare institutions differs greatly between countries. Studies from 
economics, management and organization theories suggest that the form of organization, par-
ticularly the centralization or decentralization of responsibilities, may have far-reaching im-
plications (Besley and Coate, 2003; Richardson et al., 2002; Hutchcroft, 2001). Also, in the 
case of welfare administration, different organizational systems are likely to result in different 
incentives and strategies and can influence the success of bringing unemployed welfare re-
cipients back into employment. Given that public welfare spending accounts for a significant 
portion of total government expenditure, and given that labor market integration of welfare 
recipients is the principal task of the public welfare administration for the unemployed, the 
improvement of organizational effectiveness is a question of foremost economic importance.  
One key component in the organization of welfare administration is the degree of local 
autonomy versus centralization. In a decentralized setting, local authorities are responsible for 
the activation of welfare recipients and act independently from central directives and guide-
lines. Conversely, in a centralized structure, welfare administration is organized by a coun-
trywide government agency that issues directives on how the activation of welfare recipients 
should be implemented at the local level.  
The degree of centralization of welfare administration varies considerably between 
countries. In the Netherlands, local authorities form the basis of the public welfare system. In 
the UK, by contrast, public welfare administration is part of the central government structure. 
In other countries, welfare reform has changed the degree of centralization of welfare admini-
stration. The 1996 U.S. welfare reform, for instance, devolved greater program authority from 
the federal level to the states, and the Canadian reform that same year gave greater discretion 
to the provinces (Blank, 2002).  
Theoretical arguments in favor of a decentralized organization are based on the idea 
that local authorities are better informed about the characteristics of the local labor market. 
They are assumed to have detailed knowledge about the specific attributes and changes that 
have been made, and are thought to be most effective in providing services that are tailored to 
local conditions. Conversely, central organizations often have an advantage in bundling re-
sources, collecting information from various sources, and imposing best-practice strategies for 
its local offices. 
Even though there is an increasing evaluation literature concerning the effectiveness of 
active labor market policy programs and certain elements of welfare reform (most of them 
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from the United States1, Germany2 or other European3 countries), evidence of the effects of 
the welfare system organization is scarce. One reason for this is that centralization or decen-
tralization applies to countries as a whole, which makes it difficult to detangle the effects of a 
particular organizational setting from other aspects of the welfare system or its reform. So far, 
conclusions are derived from case studies only (Lindsay and McQuaid, 2008; Tergeist and 
Grubb, 2006).  
The aim of this paper is to provide quantitative evidence on the relative performance 
of a centralized and decentralized organization of welfare administration. We exploit the 2005 
reform of the German welfare system that introduced two competing types of organization – a 
centralized and a decentralized structure – in an otherwise homogenous institutional frame-
work. According to the experimentation clause in the German Social Code, both approaches 
were pursued in parallel for a limited period of time, after which, the more successful model 
should be determined. 4 In most districts, a centralized organization was established, in which 
the welfare agencies are subject to the directives and guidelines of the Federal Employment 
Agency. However, a total of 69 out of the 439 German districts were allowed to opt out in 
favor of a decentralized organization that is legally and organizationally independent from 
central directives and guidelines. Virtually all other components of public welfare and labor 
market policy – such as benefit entitlements, the tax-benefit system in general, and labor mar-
ket institutions such as minimum wages and employment protection – apply equally to the 
centralized and decentralized systems of welfare administration.  
In order to evaluate the performance of the two organizational systems, we investigate 
the successful integration of welfare recipients into the labor market. Our empirical analysis is 
                                              
1 For a review of U.S. welfare reforms and the related empirical literature, we refer to Blank (2002), Moffitt 
(2002), and Grogger and Karoly (2005). Bloom and Michalopoulos (2001) synthesize the results of 29 studies 
investigating the effects of various US welfare-to-work programs. 
2 Hohmeyer and Wolff (2007); Wolff and Jozwiak (2007); Bernhard et al. (2008); Boockmann et al. (2009); 
Aldashev et al. (2010); Huber et al. (2010); and Thomsen and Walter (2010) have evaluated the effects of vari-
ous German welfare-to-work programs after 2005 and obtained mixed results on employment and welfare re-
ceipt depending on the programs and populations considered. 
3 Surveys on welfare reform in Europe (countries other than Germany) are provided by Torfing (1999); Kildal 
(2001); and Halvorsen and Jensen (2004) for the Nordic countries; Finn (2000); Beaudry (2002); and Dostal 
(2008) for the UK, and Finn (2000) and Knijn (2001) for the Netherlands. See also Martin and Grubb (2001) and 
Kluve (2006) for comprehensive overviews. 
4 A description of the experimentation clause in German Social Code with details of implementation, context and 
policy results is provided by Deutscher Bundestag (2008). 
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based on a unique data set that is compiled from in-depth surveys of welfare administration, 
FEA register data, comprehensive surveys of welfare recipients and extensive regional infor-
mation. These data contain information on the organizational and strategic features of welfare 
agencies, which is usually unavailable.  
In the next section, we describe the set-up of the German welfare system for the pre- 
and post-reform period. Section 3 introduces the data, while Section 4 outlines the methodo-
logical approach. Estimation results are presented in Section 5, and conclusions are drawn in 
the final section. 
 
2  The German Welfare Reform of 2005 
Before 2005, the same organization of welfare administration applied to all 439 districts (in 
German, Kreise and kreisfreie Städte) in Germany. There were two different types of benefits: 
unemployment and social assistance, which were administered by two different authorities. 
The centrally organized Federal Employment Agency (FEA), represented by the local em-
ployment offices, was in charge of unemployment assistance, a means-tested benefit for indi-
viduals with long-term unemployment after their claims to unemployment insurance benefits 
had expired. Local authorities, in contrast, were responsible for social assistance, a benefit for 
individuals who had not accumulated sufficient benefit entitlements to be entitled to unem-
ployment insurance benefits or who were unable to work. This organization of the welfare 
system, with its two distinct administrative bodies, was often judged as overly fragmented 
(Tergeist and Grubb, 2006; Konle-Seidl et al., 2007) and resulted in disincentives with respect 
to integration into the labor market. 
To remove these shortcomings, welfare system reform, implemented in January 2005, 
merged unemployment and social assistance into a single benefit, Unemployment Benefit II 
(UBII). In contrast to unemployment assistance, and similar to the former social assistance, 
UBII does not depend on former earnings. To be eligible for UBII, persons must be between 
the ages of 15 to 64 and must be able to work for at least 15 hours per week. Means-testing 
takes into account the wealth and income of all individuals living in the household. Individu-
als who are employed but have insufficient household income are also eligible for the benefit. 
UBII recipients are obliged to actively look for work and to participate in the welfare-to-work 
programs that are assigned to them.  
An important element of the reform was that, per district, all welfare services (benefit 
payments, counseling, labor market activation, etc.) were provided by one welfare agency, as 
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opposed to the previous division of tasks and responsibilities between two administrative enti-
ties. However, there was no political consensus on where the new welfare agencies should be 
established: within the system of the centralized FEA or at the local authorities.  
Ultimately, the introduction of the experimentation clause of Chapter 6c of Book II of 
the German Social Code mandated a policy experiment and the evaluation of the relative per-
formance of two competing models. In the majority of the 439 German districts, local em-
ployment offices and local authorities formed a joint venture5 that was subject to the central 
controlling standards of the FEA. Within the joint venture, the FEA is in charge of the ad-
ministration of benefits, job placement, and the application of the main instruments of active 
labor market policy. In particular, guidelines for the use of active labor market policies, job 
placement and technical standards as computer software of the FEA are binding for central-
ized districts. Local authorities are tasked with administering payments for housing costs and 
special needs. Moreover, they provide counseling in specific contexts such as lone parent 
families, home care for elderly or disabled relatives, or alcohol and drug addiction. 6  
Out of the 439 German districts, 69 were allowed to opt for a more decentralized or-
ganization of welfare administration.7 Under this system, local authorities autonomously op-
erate the entire activation process, including counseling, benefits disbursement, job place-
ment, and the allocation of benefit recipients to active labor market programs. In particular, 
local welfare agencies are legally and organizationally independent from central directives 
and guidelines in the decentralized system.  
Table 1 summarizes the key characteristics of centralized and decentralized welfare 
agencies. In both the centralized and the decentralized systems, the largest share of welfare 
payment is financed by the federal government; only a small fraction of overall expenditure – 
identical in all districts – is taken from local tax budgets.  
Include Table 1 here. 
 
                                              
5 This joint venture is called Arbeitsgemeinschaft (ARGE) in German. 
6 A variant of this model arose where the local employment office and local authorities could not agree on form-
ing a joint venture. In this case, both institutions continued to work separately in the district. However, because 
tasks are shared in a similar way as in the case of the centralized system, we do not differentiate between these 
two types in the empirical analysis.  
7 The German term for a decentralized district is zugelassener kommunaler Träger (zkT).  
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It is important to understand the selection of districts into the two regimes. The num-
ber of decentralized districts (69) is equal to the number of deputies in the Bundesrat, the sec-
ond chamber of the German Parliament. Each federal state could have anywhere between 
three and six decentralized districts, corresponding to its number of deputies in the Bundesrat. 
Within each state, districts could apply to opt out of the centralized system. In cases of excess 
demand, the state government made a selection from the applying districts.  
In several federal states, the maximum number of districts that could opt for decentral-
ized organization was not exhausted. The vacant places could then be filled by the districts 
not selected from other states in the first round. Looking at the regional distribution of appli-
cations, it appears that the selection process was strongly influenced by political affiliations. 
In both Lower Saxony and Hesse, where the conservative governments were strongly in favor 
of the decentralized system, 13 districts were allowed to opt out, even though these states only 
had 6 and 5 seats in the Bundesrat, respectively. In contrast, hardly any districts were pro-
posed from Mecklenburg-West Pomerania or Rhineland-Palatinate, both of which were run at 
that time by social democrats. Hence, the rules for selection resulted in a regional concentra-
tion of decentralized agencies (WZB et al., 2008). 
 
3  Description of the Data 
In order to investigate whether centralized or decentralized welfare agencies are more suc-
cessful in integrating welfare recipients into employment, we use a unique data set that was 
specifically collected for this research question.8 The data are confined to 154 districts, a sub-
set of all 439 German districts; of the sample districts, 51 are decentralized. The remaining 
103 districts have a centralized organization. They were selected to obtain regional units with 
similar characteristics as the 51 decentralized agencies. Although evidence suggests that the 
adoption of a decentralized system was driven by the political affiliation of the state govern-
ments (WZB et al., 2008), some association could remain between local labor market charac-
teristics and the opt-out from centralized welfare administration. Therefore, the distribution of 
regional characteristics is accounted for in the sampling procedure. In addition, we control for 
regional characteristics in the matching estimator (see Section 4).  
                                              
8 This data set is publicly available as a scientific use file at the Federal Employment Agency. See Oertel et al. 
(2009) for details on data access. 
 5
When choosing comparable districts, we built directly on the previous work of Arntz 
et al. (2006)9. These authors identify regional variables that are relevant to the transition of 
the long-term unemployed into the labor market. In a second step, the authors use the reduced 
set of relevant regional variables and apply the distance matching suggested by Zhao (2004) 
to identify comparable districts in a regional matching procedure. Appendix 1 illustrates the 
regional location of the districts in our sample.  
Appendix 2 shows that the matching of regions equalizes the means of the relevant re-
gional variables. The table shows that equality of means cannot be rejected for the majority of 
the variables; the only exceptions are those variables that depend on the degree of urbaniza-
tion of the district such as, for example, the share of commuters. Here, the mean in centralized 
districts is slightly higher than it is in decentralized districts. Furthermore, the employment 
rate, as an indicator of local labor market conditions, is weakly significantly different between 
both groups.  
To obtain data on the organizational structure of the welfare agencies, repeated inter-
views (both standardized and semi-structured) were conducted with the agencies’ manage-
ment and staff in the 154 sample units. These surveys provided information about the type of 
case management, the activation concept, the placement strategies, the mix of active labor 
market policies, and several other organizational issues.10 Apart from this information, a wide 
range of regional variables (e.g., unemployment rates, welfare ratios, GDP, population den-
sity, share of foreigners, etc.) were collected for each agency for both before and after the 
2005 reform. 
The individual-level data consist of a survey of welfare recipients who were registered 
at the 154 agencies. Between January and April 2007, 100 to 300 telephone interviews were 
conducted within each agency with welfare recipients; the number of interviews depended on 
the size of the welfare agency. In total, nearly 24,600 interviews were conducted. Approxi-
mately 80% (20,300) of the individuals interviewed were drawn from the stock of UBII re-
cipients who were receiving welfare benefits in October 2006 (stock sample), whereas 20% 
(4,300) of the interviews are from an inflow sample of people entering the welfare system 
between August and December 2006. Unfortunately, entries into UBII in earlier months could 
not be sampled due to gaps in the data (see Section 4). In this paper, our analysis focuses on 
                                              
9 The study by Arntz et al. (2006) was conducted to prepare the evaluation of the welfare reform.  
10 We use some of these organizational strategies in Section 5.2 to provide additional insights into the black box 
of welfare administration. 
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the stock sample. Because a large share of UBII recipients depend on welfare benefits for an 
extended period of time, the stock sample covers those individuals for whom the organization 
of welfare administration matters the most.  
The survey data include individual characteristics (gender, age, marital and parental 
status, education, health and disability status, migration background, etc.), information on 
members of the household (number and age of household members and respondent’s relation 
to them), and details concerning the labor market status and labor market history (current la-
bor market state, former spells of insured and minor employment, former spells of unem-
ployment, receipt of welfare benefits, participation in activation programs). Moreover, the 
surveys contain information about basic skills (e.g. reading, writing, math, and computer 
skills), further qualifications (e.g. driver’s license), job search activities, and the concessions 
that respondents would be willing to make in order to obtain a new job. 
The survey data were linked with administrative data from the FEA at the individual 
level. The administrative data include daily information about periods of employment and 
unemployment, job seeking, participation in active labor market programs, and benefit re-
ceipt. This information allows for the construction of comprehensive labor market histories of 
the sampled individuals. Descriptive information on these variables is presented in Section 
4.3.  
The outcome variables of interest are also provided by the FEA and indicate for each 
month between January and December 2007, the employment status of individuals under two 
definitions: employment without welfare receipt and employment combined with welfare re-
ceipt. In the first case, gross labor earnings (plus any income from other sources such as capi-
tal earnings) exceed the income threshold below which the individual is eligible for welfare 
benefits. In the second case, welfare benefits are paid in addition to labor earnings (and other 
non-benefit income) because employment does not provide a sufficient living income. In this 
case, integration into employment may be considered as only partially successful (partial in-
tegration).11  
Because our analysis focuses on integration into employment, we restrict the sample to 
individuals who were unemployed at the time they entered the welfare system and at the time 
                                              
11 The administrative data only contains information regarding employment that is subject to social insurance 
contribution. Therefore, our two outcome variables do not include spells of minor employment or self-
employment. Both outcome variables are measured as binary variables. 
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of sampling. Furthermore, we restrict the data to persons aged between 18 and 57 years;12 due 
to these restrictions, we have 13,286 observations (4,489 persons from districts with decen-
tralized welfare organization and 8,797 from districts with centralized organization).  
 
4  Estimation Approach  
4.1 Individual Selection into Treatment 
In the following, we consider decentralized organization of the local welfare administration as 
our treatment variable. To identify the causal effect, we must rule out selective participation 
in treatment. The most common types of selectivity encountered in the evaluation of labor 
market policies are self-selection and selection by a caseworker into the program. In our case, 
these types of selectivity were very unlikely. From the point of view of a welfare recipient or 
the caseworker, the 2005 reform of welfare administration and organization is an exogenous 
event that cannot be easily influenced. The only way to select into treatment would be to 
move to another district. However, welfare recipients usually cannot afford to relocate and are 
not encouraged to move as long as they remain on welfare. 
A more serious problem could be that our sample was not drawn in January 2005 
(when the reform was introduced) but in 2006, i.e. more than one year after the implementa-
tion of the reform. The reason for this delay is that the disruptions caused by the reform cre-
ated considerable problems for the quality of administrative data during several months after 
the introduction of the reform. This particularly applied to decentralized welfare agencies, 
which continued to use their local computer systems. In principle, an interface for data collec-
tion was provided by the FEA, allowing these welfare agencies to feed their data directly into 
the FEA’s statistics. In practice, however, the use of the interface was incomplete until the 
second half of 2006. Centralized agencies, on the other hand, had issues with a newly intro-
duced software system. For these reasons, the quality of the data during the early periods after 
the reform is insufficient for our analysis. Therefore, we exclusively rely on data from 2006 
and 2007. At this point in time, however, the composition of welfare recipients in the districts 
could itself be an outcome of decentralized or centralized organization. Thus, for example, if 
the centralized system were faster in integrating welfare recipients with good employment 
prospects in the early periods after the reform, the stock of welfare recipients in 2006 might 
                                              
12 Persons aged 58 or older are no longer required to actively search for employment but may remain on welfare 
benefits until they reach the official retirement age of 65. Individuals aged 15 to 17 years are subject to compul-
sory schooling and cannot be expected to take up employment.  
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contain fewer welfare recipients with favorable characteristics than in decentralized dis-
tricts.13  
Another potential kind of selection concerns the inflow into welfare receipt. As men-
tioned in Section 2, UBII recipients must be able to work for at least 15 hours a week. In de-
termining whether claimants to UBII meet this requirement, welfare agencies possess a con-
siderable degree of leeway. If ability criteria differ systematically between centralized and 
decentralized welfare agencies, this may result in a different composition of welfare recipients 
with regard to characteristics such as illness or disability.  
In order to solve these potential problems, we use a matching estimator that controls 
for individual-level selection. Because our data set combines administrative and survey data 
and captures all conceivable aspects of determining success in the labor market, we are confi-
dent that we are able to actually identify the causal effect of treatment. In addition, we check 
whether regional variables should be included, in addition to restricting the sample to compa-
rable welfare agencies as described in Section 3.  
 
4.2  Controlling for Selection by Statistical Matching 
We define two possible treatment states for individual i: D = 1 for being registered at a decen-
tralized welfare agency. or D = 0 for being registered at a centralized welfare agency. The 
potential binary employment outcomes corresponding to each of the states are denoted Y1i and 
Y0i. The individual treatment effect is defined as the difference between the two potential out-
comes. Since the individual cannot be in both states at the same time, the observable outcome 
for i is given by Yi = Y1i ·Di + (1 −Di) · Y0i. We estimate the average effect of treatment on the 
treated (ATT), defined as  
ATT = E(Y1−Y0|D=1) = E(Y1|D=1) − E(Y0|D=1).     (1) 
                                              
13 This example is purely hypothetical. In fact, the extensive implementation studies (WZB et al., 2008) that 
were conducted as part of the evaluation do not suggest that either of the two models of organization had an 
advantage in integrating easy-to-place workers in 2005-06. In addition to controlling for selection by matching, 
estimations with a smaller sample of inflows into welfare receipt after October 2006 yielded even more pro-
nounced results than the ones reported here. The estimated treatment effect of decentralized organization on 
leaving welfare receipt is -7.63% and is significant at the 1% level. The effect on employment is -4.01% and is 
significant at 10% level (ZEW et al., 2008, p. 184). Focusing exclusively on the inflows, however, would have 
provided only a partial view of the activation and integration process given the high proportion of long-term 
welfare recipients.  
 9
The second term on the right-hand side of (1) is not identified from the data without 
additional assumptions. Simply comparing the observable average outcomes of persons living 
in districts with centralized welfare agencies to approximate the unobservable outcomes for 
persons registered at decentralized agencies leads to biased estimates if individuals in the two 
types of agencies differ in characteristics that affect the expected outcomes, i.e. 
E(Y0|D = 1) E(Y≠ 1|D = 1).  
To overcome this potential bias, we apply a matching estimator, using persons living 
in centralized districts who are similar in all relevant characteristics to the treatment group as 
a control group. The method is based on the intuitive principle that it is possible to “adjust 
away” differences between treated and non-treated outcomes by finding appropriate matches 
(Heckman et al., 1999). If this is true, the matching approach makes it possible to compare the 
treated and non-treated outcomes directly, without imposing further structure on the estima-
tion problem.  
The method of matching is a non-parametric approach and, therefore, no structural or 
parametric assumptions are required. However, it puts strong requirements on the data. In 
order for the ATT to be identified, the so-called Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) 
must be fulfilled (Lechner, 2001). This means that, conditional on the set of relevant observ-
able covariates X, the potential outcome Y0 is independent of the organizational model: 
Y0C D|X. In addition, it must be ensured that people who resemble the welfare recipients’ 
characteristics distribution in districts with decentralized organization are available in districts 
with centralized welfare administration (common support condition), i.e., Pr(D = 1|X) < 1 
(Smith and Todd, 2005a).  
Direct matching on X is difficult if X is of high dimension, as many empty cells for 
particular combinations of covariate values occur. Therefore, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
suggest the use of balancing scores. One possible balancing score is the probability of being 
subject to treatment, the propensity score p(X) = E(D = 1|X). This statistic summarizes the 
relevant covariates X in a single index function. All biases due to observable covariates are 
removed by conditioning solely on the propensity score.  
The literature provides a number of different matching estimators (Heckman et al., 
1999). These estimators differ with respect to the weights given to individuals in the control 
group that are considered to form the counterfactual outcome. We use a kernel matching esti-
mator, which weighs the control observations according to their “distance” (in terms of the 
propensity score) to the treated individuals by means of an Epanechnikov kernel function and 
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a bandwidth of 0.06. According to Abadie and Imbens (2008), bootstrapped standard errors 
are unbiased for kernel matching (due to the smoothness of the objective function). Therefore, 
we estimate the standard errors using a bootstrap procedure with 250 replications. Persons 
residing in the same district may be affected by common shocks; this could affect the statisti-
cal inference, although it would not affect the consistency of the estimator. We account for 
this inference problem by estimating clustered standard errors at the agency level (using the 
non-overlapping block bootstrap), i.e. by re-sampling persons on the agency level, but not on 
the individual level.  
Lastly, we need to invoke the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) 
(Rubin, 1986) to render the model useful for causal analysis. The SUTVA rules out any cross-
effects, meaning that the outcome for any individual must not depend on whether any other 
individual is in a centralized or decentralized district. In particular, substitution and displace-
ment effects must not be present. This requires the regional labor markets to be sufficiently 
separated so that the success of one welfare agency with respect to job placement does not 
come at the cost of another welfare agency. Moreover, there should not be any general equi-
librium effects. These requirements are addressed by a study at the aggregate level of all 439 
welfare agencies (see IFO and IAW, 2008). From the findings of this study, there is robust 
evidence that the SUTVA holds.  
 
4.3  Specification of the Propensity Score and Balancing Tests 
As noted above, identification of the estimated treatment effects depends on the plausibility of 
the CIA, i.e. whether conditioning on the variables included in the propensity score removes 
any correlation between the treatment and the outcome variables. The availability of data for 
all relevant characteristics and their inclusion in the propensity score are, therefore, crucial 
requirements. At the individual level, we have access to a wide range of socio-demographic 
characteristics beyond the standard set of controls, such as migration background, household 
size and members, health impairments, basic mathematics, literacy and computer skills, self-
assessed working capacity (measured in hours per day) and obstacles to employment such as 
provision of long-term care of relatives. In addition, we have detailed information on the labor 
market history of each individual, including frequency and duration of employment, unem-
ployment, job seeking activity, active labor market policy program participation, and benefit 
receipt between 2001 and 2004 as well as information on more recent labor market history.  
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Our data lacks direct measures of individual motivation, attitudes, and aptitude. It is, 
however, likely that these characteristics are relatively persistent over time such that they 
have impacted labor market success before the treatment. For this reason, it is crucial that we 
are able to condition on individual employment histories in a detailed manner. This is also 
emphasized by Card and Sullivan (1988) and Heckman et al. (1998). Thus, making use of our 
unusually rich data set, we are confident that we capture all relevant factors that affect both 
participation in treatment and our outcome variables of interest. 
Since we have a large number of potential control variables at our disposal for the 
specification of the propensity score, and because including irrelevant covariates may intro-
duce noise into the calculation of the propensity score, we choose different specifications in 
order to check the robustness of the estimated treatment effects. The first specification con-
tains the most important individual characteristics –gender, age, education, household compo-
sition, and several indicators for labor market history – as well as limited regional informa-
tion. Based on the results of balancing tests, this parsimonious specification is our preferred 
specification. To these variables, we add further regional information in the second specifica-
tion. The third specification contains the full set of covariates. Descriptive statistics for all 
variables are contained in Appendix 3, and the estimation results for the propensity score are 
illustrated in Appendix 4 for our preferred specification. All estimations are done separately 
for men and women.  
Include Table 2 here. 
To assess the quality of matching, we apply the following four balancing tests. First, 
we compare the means of the variables included in the propensity score between treatment 
and the control group and test for differences by applying t-tests. After successful matching, 
there should be no remaining differences in the distribution of the covariates. Second, we fol-
low Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), who suggest the use of the so-called standardized bias. 
Differences in means of single covariates between the treatment and control group are com-
pared before and after matching, standardized by the mean standard deviation across groups 
before matching. A third test relates to the explanatory power of the propensity score model 
after matching. Re-running the same probit regression on the matched sample should result in 
an explained treatment variation of almost zero, as measured by the McFadden-R2 (Sianesi, 
2004). Fourth, we apply the quality indicator as suggested by Smith and Todd (2005b):  
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Each variable included in the propensity score is regressed on a higher-order polyno-
mial of the propensity score, the treatment indicator, and the interaction between both. In the 
ideal case, coefficients β5 to β9 should be jointly zero, indicating that there is no further ob-
servable selection into the treatment conditional on the propensity score. 
As can be seen from the results of the balancing tests depicted in Table 2 and Appen-
dix 3, matching quality is very satisfactory.14 Appendix 3 shows that the equality of means of 
the variables included in the propensity score specification between treatment and control 
group cannot be rejected in just about any case. According to Table 2, the mean standardized 
bias is severely reduced after matching. The McFadden-R2 estimates of the third test are al-
most zero after matching; thus, as intended, re-running the propensity score specification on 
the matched sample does not result in any explanatory power of the included covariates. In 
addition, almost all of the variables included in the propensity score model pass the test sug-
gested by Smith and Todd (2005b).  
 
5  Empirical results 
For the evaluation of the relative effectiveness of decentralized vs. centralized welfare ad-
ministration, we distinguish two different outcomes: employment without welfare receipt and 
employment with welfare receipt. Employment without welfare receipt means that the indi-
vidual takes up employment and generates enough living income so that the individual does 
not receive welfare benefits. Employment with welfare receipt means that the individual is 
employed but still receives welfare benefits because employment does not provide a sufficient 
living income. Employment with welfare receipt could provide a stepping stone into employ-
ment without welfare receipt. From a policy point of view, we consider employment without 
welfare receipt as the more relevant measure to be used to assess the relative effectiveness of 
the two administrative models.  
 
14 The table contains results for our preferred specification. A complete set of results is provided by the authors 
on request. 
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Before presenting the estimation results, we briefly describe the means of our individ-
ual outcome variables and compare them across individuals who are registered at centralized 
and decentralized welfare agencies (see Figures 1 and 2). 
Include Figures 1 and 2 here. 
For men and employment without welfare receipt, employment rates in districts with 
centralized welfare agencies are larger than they are in districts with decentralized organiza-
tion (Figure 1). By December 2007, we observe a difference of about one and a half percent-
age points between decentralized and centralized welfare agencies (16.8% for centralized and 
15.2% for decentralized welfare agencies). There is no difference between the two organiza-
tional models for women and for employment with welfare receipt for both genders.  
Our econometric analysis is consistent with these descriptive findings. As discussed in 
Section 4, we use three different specifications for the propensity score. The estimated treat-
ment effects of decentralized welfare agencies on the integration into employment without 
welfare receipt are presented in Figures 3 and 4 for both men and women. Rather than show-
ing treatment effects at a single observation date, we display their evolution over the course of 
2007, the year after sampling.  
Include Figures 3 and 4 here. 
For men, we observe a negative treatment effect, i.e. decentralized welfare agencies 
are less successful than centralized agencies in placing welfare recipients in jobs that provide 
a sufficient living income. The absolute effect rises from one to over three percentage points 
from January to August 2007, and declines moderately thereafter. These magnitudes are 
slightly larger than the descriptive evidence presented in Figure 1. The effects for May to No-
vember are significant at 5%, with t-statistics ranging from 1.96 to 2.91. With the exception 
of April, the effects for the other months are significant at 10%. The inclusion of further co-
variates leaves the estimated effects virtually unaffected. For women, we also find negative 
treatment effects, which are, however, smaller in magnitude than for men and are not statisti-
cally significant. 
Given the relatively small fraction of people taking up employment without welfare 
receipt (Figure 1), the effect for men is substantial. The largest estimated effect of 3.5 per-
centage points, estimated for August 2007, implies that decentralized agencies have a 24% 
lower integration quota than do centralized agencies. The differences in the treatment effects 
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between men and women are conspicuous; in principle, the gender differences could result 
from a different treatment of men and women in each type of welfare agency. As of Decem-
ber, 2007, 44% of centralized agencies, compared to only 14% of decentralized agencies, 
were lacking a staff member specifically assigned to the task of ensuring equal opportunities 
and gender mainstreaming (IAW and ZEW, 2008, Table A1). This may provide some expla-
nation as to why decentralized agencies perform relatively better in placing women into self-
sufficient employment than men. In our interpretation, however, the differences between men 
and women can also be explained by the fact that it is often more difficult for women than for 
men to leave benefit receipt (Figure 1). This is primarily due to childcare obligations, which 
are still borne to a large extent by women, and insufficient child care facilities. Indeed, nearly 
30% of female welfare recipients in the sample are single mothers. Also, while 72% of male 
welfare recipients state that they are capable of fulltime work, this is true for only 52% of the 
women in the sample (see Appendix 3).  
Therefore, the treatment effect for men would suggest that centralized agencies do 
relatively well in placing welfare recipients into jobs unless further obstacles to employment 
such as child care obligations are present. In the absence of these obstacles, the centralized 
structure, with its highly standardized approaches to job placement, proves effective. Once 
individual obstacles are present, both types of welfare agencies perform equally because stan-
dardized procedures do not help in these cases.  
Regarding employment with welfare receipt, the estimated treatment effects of decen-
tralized welfare administration tend to be positive (Figures 5 and 6). However, the estimated 
effects are relatively small in magnitude (up to 1.4 percentage points for women, and up to 1 
percentage point for men) and are not statistically significant. We tend to find a more pro-
nounced effect for women, with the treatment effect reaching 10% significance in September 
2007 in one out of three specifications of the propensity score. However, given the low sig-
nificance overall, these differences should not be over-emphasized. We also note again that all 
of our estimates are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables at the regional and 
individual level.  
 Include Figures 5 and 6 here. 
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6  Looking Deeper into the Black Box of Welfare Administration 
The significant treatment effect for men on employment without welfare receipt raises the 
question of whether centralized agencies are inherently better in placing welfare recipients 
into jobs or whether they use more successful approaches and strategies than could also be 
adopted by decentralized agencies. All centralized welfare agencies are subject to central FEA 
guidelines, central controlling, and certain directives regarding the use of activation strategies. 
Nevertheless, welfare agencies have leeway in the way they internally organize their services 
for welfare recipients. The implementation of organizational approaches is not specific to ei-
ther administrative model, and we observe variations within both agencies with different or-
ganizational features. The question then arises: does the relative success of centralized agen-
cies hinge on centralization itself? 
To answer this question, we exploit in-depth data on the organizational strategies ap-
plied in the welfare agencies. According to the implementation studies (IAW and ZEW, 2008; 
WZB et al., 2008), the following features are the most important elements in the internal or-
ganization of tasks and the cooperation with external partners:15
1) Generalized case management for all clients as opposed to case management 
by specialized staff for clients with multiple obstacles to employment 
2) Integration of activation and placement as opposed to the separation of these 
functions 
3) Use of customer segmentation procedures 
4) Establishment of an employer service, i.e. specialized staff maintaining con-
tact with employers 
5) Subcontracting of placement services to private providers 
Table 3 provides a more detailed description of the organizational features, and outlines 
some arguments as to why they could affect the integration success of welfare recipients. As 
can also be seen from the table, customer segmentation and particularly, generalized case 
management tend to be used much more frequently by decentralized agencies; integration of 
activation and placement is slightly more common among centralized agencies, while the 
other two strategies are not related to agency type.  
                                              
15 The effects of further characteristics and strategies of the welfare agencies are considered in ZEW et al. 
(2008).  
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Include Table 3 here. 
To check whether the effect of decentralized agencies can be attributed to one of these 
strategies, we require a multivariate framework using agency type and strategies. For this 
purpose, we use binary probit models; the probit estimations contain all covariates used in the 
preferred specification of the propensity score. In addition, dummy variables for decentralized 
welfare agencies and for the organizational features are included. We then test whether a sig-
nificant effect of decentralized agencies remains, despite controlling for organization.  
We focus on integration without welfare receipt as the outcome variable. Complete re-
sults for the probit estimations are available on request. Table 4 contains a subset of the esti-
mation results for April, August and December, 2007. The entries in the table are marginal 
effects of the dummy variables on the outcome variable and their magnitudes and treatment 
effects from matching are, therefore, comparable.  
Include Table 4 here. 
Similar to the matching results, we find a negative effect of decentralization for men. 
However, the effect is smaller (up to 2.5 percentage points) and significant only in the middle 
of the observation period. For women, the effect of decentralized agencies is again insignifi-
cant. The organizational variables themselves are mostly insignificant, the effect of an em-
ployer service in the subsample of women being the only exception. The complete set of re-
sults shows that this effect is negative and significant at 10% in the last four months of the 
observation period. This could be interpreted as evidence that the presence of a specific or-
ganizational unit of the agency specializing in employer contacts is a disadvantage for 
women. Unfortunately, there is no direct evidence with which this result can be validated.  
The significant negative effect of decentralized welfare agencies on employment with-
out welfare receipt for men is largely robust to the inclusion of further organizational strate-
gies despite a slight decline in magnitude. We conclude that this effect is due to the inherent 
differences between centralized and decentralized welfare agencies, not to the adoption of 
particular forms of internal organization.  
 
7  Conclusions 
The 2005 reform of the German welfare system introduced two competing organizational 
systems in an otherwise homogenous institutional setting: decentralized and centralized wel-
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fare agencies. In order to evaluate their relative performance, we estimate their effect on the 
integration of welfare recipients into the labor market. Our analysis takes regional differences 
as well as individual selection into account. Estimation is based on exceptionally rich data 
from various sources. We combine a detailed survey of welfare recipients with administrative 
records from the Federal Employment Agency. In addition, we use a large set of variables 
when describing the local labor market. Finally, we consider qualitative information on organ-
izational details for each welfare agency in our sample.  
We find that decentralized welfare agencies have a negative effect on male welfare re-
cipients with respect to integration into self-sufficient employment, i.e. employment without 
welfare receipt. We find insignificant effects for women and for employment with supple-
mentary welfare receipt. Based on these results, we conclude that centralized welfare admini-
stration performs better in integrating male welfare recipients into employment as opposed to 
female welfare recipients. Given the low transition intensity from welfare receipt into em-
ployment, the magnitudes of the effects for men are substantial.  
Why are there gender differences with respect to the relative performance of the two 
types of welfare agencies? In our interpretation, centralized standards and routines work ef-
fectively for welfare recipients without additional obstacles to employment. Once additional 
obstacles come into play, such as a lack of child care facilities, standardized placement loses 
its effectiveness. In particular, tailored solutions to individual needs often require the coopera-
tion of local participants. This is why, in our opinion, the centralized model has no advantage 
over the decentralized model in the case of female welfare recipients.  
We explore further channels through which our results may have emerged. Because 
welfare agencies have significant discretionary power with respect to internal organization, 
we check whether the organization of tasks at individual welfare agencies is responsible for 
the result of decentralization. Although the effects are slightly weakened by the inclusion of 
the additional organizational strategies, the overall result is not affected. We conclude that the 
negative effect of decentralization is due to inherent differences between centralized and de-
centralized welfare agencies and is not subject to their choices regarding the internal organiza-
tion of tasks. Examples of these inherent differences are the application of central guidelines 
of the Federal Employment Agency concerning the instruments of placement, activation and 
active labor market policy, as well as the (de)centralized controlling system. Because all cen-
tralized agencies are obligated to use the policies and standards mandated by the FEA, there 
is, unfortunately, no variation that could be used to distinguish these different elements.  
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This paper provides quantitative evidence on the effects of and decentralization of 
public welfare on employment transitions. The results point to the importance of the organiza-
tional aspects of welfare administration to the integration of welfare recipients into employ-
ment. In particular, they suggest that the impact of organization differs between labor market 
groups. Given the high complexity of the public welfare system, identifying successful and 
less successful strategies for the organization of welfare administration remains a difficult yet 
highly relevant task.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Organizational Features of Decentralized and Centralized Welfare Agencies 
  Decentralized Agencies Centralized Agencies 
Number of Entities 69 370 
Legal Form Part of local administration Part of FEA, but is a sepa-
rate legal entity 
Organizational Affiliation Local authorities Joint venture between local 
employment office of the 
FEA and local authorities 
Main Source of Financing Federal government Federal government 
Centralized Standards of FEA Not binding, although legal 
restrictions exist 
Binding for job placement, 
provision of active labor 
market programs, monitor-
ing of efforts 
Software Specific solutions for each 
local authority 
Standard system of FEA  
Remarks: The 370 centralized agencies include 19 agencies with separate task perform-
ance (see footnote 9). The numbers presented here refer to October 2006 and are based on 
the 439 German districts at this time. 
 
 
Table 2: Indicators for Matching Quality 
  Men Women 
Before Matching 
McFadden-R2 0.012 0.009 
LR-Test 92.730 77.630 
p-value 0.000 0.000 
Mean standardized bias  4.686 4.977 
After Matching 
McFadden-R2 0.000 0.001 
LR-Test 2.740 9.050 
p-value 1.000 0.999 
Mean standardized bias  0.829 1.440 
Smith and Todd (2005b) balancing test 
p-values > 0.05 25 19 
p-values > 0.01 25 24 
Remarks: McFadden-R2 derives from a probit estimation of the propensity score on all co-
variates considered. The LR-statistic and the corresponding p-value derive from a likeli-
hood-ratio test of the joint insignificance of all covariates. The mean standardized bias has 
been calculated as an unweighted average of all covariates. The Smith-Todd test displays the 
number of covariates passing the test at the indicated significance level. There are 26 total 
covariates. 
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Table 3: Definition of Organizational Variables 
Definition Possible Impact on Integration Frequency in Sample 
Generalized Case Management 
Case managers counsel all types of 
clients. There is no assignment of 
welfare recipients with multiple 
obstacles to employment to spe-
cialist caseworkers.  
Better placement under specialized 
case management if clients with 
specific problems require special-
ized expertise. Generalized case 
management facilitates individual 
counseling as clients have fewer 
contact persons.  
0.69 (decentralized agencies) 
0.24 (centralized agencies)  
Integration of Activation and Placement 
Clients are counseled (activated) 
and placed into employment by the 
same staff members. There is no 
assignment of specialized staff to 
the two tasks.  
Integration reduces the number of 
contact persons for each welfare 
recipient, and facilitates a holistic 
approach. In contrast, separation 
leads to gains from specialization 
but may create coordination prob-
lems at the interface of both tasks. 
0.51 (decentralized) 
0.59 (centralized) 
Customer Segmentation 
Classification of clients into differ-
ent groups receiving different 
treatment during activation  
Segmentation may increase em-
ployment rates among groups that 
are activated more intensely but 
reduces integration into employ-
ment in other groups. 
0.84 (decentralized) 
0.66 (centralized) 
Employer Service 
A team of agency staff members 
maintains a network with employ-
ers and serves as contact persons 
for them 
Networking may result in better 
placement. However, internal co-
ordination problems between the 
employer service and caseworkers 
may arise.  
0.86 (decentralized) 
0.83 (centralized) 
Subcontracting of Placement Services 
The welfare agency uses private 
employment services to place some 
of their clients into employment.  
Specialization gains may occur. 
However, private agencies may 
work more or less effectively com-
pared to the public employment 
service. Requires proper assign-
ment of welfare recipients to ser-
vice providers. 
0.41 (decentralized ) 
0.40 (centralized ) 
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Table 4: Estimated Profit Effects of Organizational Features  
  Men Women 
  April August December April August December 
       
-0.011 -0.026 -0.016 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 Decentralized welfare agency 
0.007 0.012 0.014 0.006 0.007 0.011 
0.004 0.001 -0.009 -0.006 0.000 0.003 Generalized case management 
0.007 0.012 0.014 0.006 0.007 0.010 
-0.001 -0.006 -0.004 0.004 0.009 -0.001 Integration of activation and 
placement  0.007 0.010 0.013 0.006 0.007 0.009 
0.001 -0.009 0.007 0.001 -0.004 0.002 Customer segmentation 
0.007 0.010 0.012 0.006 0.007 0.009 
-0.009 0.003 -0.019 -0.013 -0.013 -0.025 * Employer service 
0.008 0.013 0.017 0.009 0.011 0.014 
-0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.005 -0.003 -0.008 Subcontracting of placement 
services 0.006 0.010 0.012 0.006 0.007 0.009 
       
McFadden-R2 0.069 0.067 0.069 0.081 0.078 0.072 
Log-Likelihood -1559.59 -2368.69 -2571.75 -1358.90 -1838.24 -2141.99 
              
Remarks: Marginal effects (first row) and standard errors (second row) are displayed *** denotes p<0.01, ** 
denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1. The dependent variable in each model and for each month is defined as 1 if 
an individual is employed and does not receive welfare benefits anymore. Otherwise, the variable is 0. The num-
ber of observations in each model is 6217. Standard errors take into account clustering at the agency level. All 
models include the covariates used in the preferred propensity score specification of the matching analysis as 
further regressors. The detailed results are not displayed here but are available from the authors upon request.  
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Figure 1: Means of the outcome variable “employment without welfare receipt” 
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Figure 2: Means of the outcome variable “employment with welfare receipt” 
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Figure 3: Estimated treatment effects on employment without welfare receipt, men 
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Notes:  ♦ indicates significance at the 5% level, ◊ significance at the 10% level 
 
Figure 4: Estimated treatment effects on employment without welfare receipt, women 
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Notes:  ♦ indicates significance at the 5% level, ◊ significance at the 10% level 
 
 
 30
Figure 5: Estimated treatment effects on employment with welfare receipt, men 
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Notes:  ♦ indicates significance at the 5% level, ◊ significance at the 10% level 
 
 
Figure 6: Estimated treatment effects on employment with welfare receipt, women 
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Notes:  ♦ indicates significance at the 5% level, ◊ significance at the 10% level 
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Appendix 1: Map of the 154 welfare agencies in the sample 
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Appendix 2: Balancing of regional variables among the sampled welfare agencies 
  
Centralized 
agencies 
Decentralized 
agencies p-value 
Unemployment rate (Source: FEA) 11.309 11.412 0.906 
Unemployment rate of the young (age < 25) (Source: FEA) 10.628 10.505 0.860 
Unemployment rate of foreigners (Source: FEA) 23.285 24.340 0.567 
Personnel expenditure per unemployed in the stock (classified) 373.435 375.562 0.867 
Personnel expenditure per unemployed (inflow) 2442.675 2440.875 0.969 
Material expenses per unemployed (classified) 45.188 48.830 0.100 
Placement expenditure as a share of total expenditure (classified) 0.024 0.028 0.315 
Ratio of caseworkers to unemployed (classified) 0.016 0.016 0.837 
Ratio of placement officers with fixed-term contract  to unem-
ployed 0.002 0.002 0.895 
Ratio of unemployed to applicants 0.804 0.802 0.570 
Ratio of male to female unemployed 1.300 1.296 0.892 
Ratio of young (< 25) to old (> 50) unemployed (in percent) 49.478 50.966 0.339 
Share of unemployed under age 25 (in percent) 12.142 12.211 0.802 
Share of unemployed over age 50 0.123 0.116 0.067 
Unemployment-Vacancy (UV) relation in textile industry 73.592 84.213 0.301 
UV relation in construction sector 37.124 35.640 0.702 
UV relation in engineering 16.267 17.857 0.567 
UV relation in commerce sector 24.820 27.332 0.462 
UV relation in service sector 20.753 24.232 0.212 
UV relation in metal industry 15.261 14.610 0.661 
UV relation in healthcare 6.346 6.356 0.983 
UV relation in social sector 11.433 11.121 0.728 
UV relation overall 30.208 32.386 0.471 
Share of employees with fixed-term contract 0.811 0.780 0.788 
Share of long-term unemployed 0.332 0.333 0.896 
Share of severely disabled unemployed 0.040 0.039 0.809 
Ratio of welfare recipients receiving no unemployment benefits 
to all unemployed 0.163 0.101 0.198 
Ratio of welfare recipients receiving no unemployment benefits 
to all unemployed welfare recipients 0.347 0.374 0.057 
Rate of long-term unemployed 0.332 0.333 0.893 
Rate of long-term unemployed under age 25 0.072 0.069 0.492 
Rate of long-term unemployed over age 50 0.508 0.505 0.769 
FF per unemployed 0.007 0.009 0.408 
FF per male unemployed 0.008 0.010 0.479 
FF per female unemployed 0.006 0.008 0.337 
FF per unemployed over age 50 0.004 0.005 0.405 
FF per unemployed under age 25 0.014 0.019 0.253 
Wage subsidies per unemployed 0.032 0.033 0.753 
Wage subsidies per unemployed over age 50 0.062 0.065 0.763 
Total transitional allowance per unemployed 0.018 0.017 0.787 
Bridging allowance per unemployed over age 50 0.008 0.009 0.638 
Bridging allowance per unemployed under age 25 0.008 0.007 0.735 
Wage subsidies for long-term unemployed per unemployed 0.002 0.003 0.168 
Wage subsidies for long-term unemployed per male unemployed 0.002 0.003 0.149 
Wage subsidies for long-term unemployed per  female unem-
ployed 0.002 0.003 0.131 
ABM+SAM/unemployed+ABM+SAM 0.025 0.029 0.444 
ABM+SAM/unemployed+ABM+SAM (men) 0.027 0.031 0.407 
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Appendix 2: Balancing of regional variables among the sampled welfare agencies 
  
Centralized 
agencies 
Decentralized 
agencies p-value 
ABM+SAM/unemployed+ABM+SAM (women) 0.023 0.026 0.508 
ABM/unemployed+ABM 0.017 0.019 0.430 
ABM/unemployed+ABM (women) 0.016 0.018 0.488 
ABM/unemployed+ABM (men) 0.017 0.020 0.389 
FbW/(unemployed+FbW) 0.058 0.060 0.205 
FbW/(unemployed+FbW) (men) 0.049 0.052 0.310 
FbW/(unemployed+FbW) (women) 0.069 0.071 0.264 
FbW/(unemployed+FbW) (age > 50) 0.014 0.015 0.360 
FbW/(unemployed+FbW) (age < 25) 0.054 0.055 0.741 
TM/(unemployed+TM) 0.022 0.022 0.637 
TM/(unemployed+TM) (women) 0.023 0.023 0.763 
TM/(unemployed+TM) (men) 0.022 0.021 0.539 
TM/(unemployed+TM) (age > 50) 0.010 0.010 0.883 
TM/(unemployed+TM) (age < 25) 0.036 0.035 0.828 
Share of ESF-assisted unemployed  0.005 0.006 0.720 
Share of persons in minor employment 0.164 0.193 0.084 
JUMP per unemployed (age <25) 0.121 0.136 0.209 
Total unemployment rate (Source: Statistical Office) 12.435 12.520 0.927 
Female unemployment rate (Source: Statistical Office) 11.601 11.839 0.808 
Male unemployment rate (Source: Statistical Office) 13.161 13.120 0.964 
Export turnover in manufacturing per employee 52.876 55.487 0.672 
Commuter balance per 1000 employees -64.233 -172.431 0.034 
Migration balance/ gross population 0.001 0.001 0.571 
Rate of social assistance recipients 0.036 0.028 0.004 
Rate of social assistance recipients (men) 0.033 0.025 0.004 
Rate of social assistance recipients (women) 0.039 0.031 0.004 
Rate of social assistance recipients (natives) 0.032 0.025 0.006 
Rate of social assistance recipients (foreigners) 0.083 0.068 0.035 
Total business founding intensity per 10000 employable persons 45.947 43.676 0.268 
Business foundations per 10000 inhabitants aged 15 to 64  149.643 146.700 0.517 
Population density (inhabitants per square meter) 833.656 339.509 0.001 
GDP per economically active person 51.657 51.343 0.826 
Employment rate 0.465 0.424 0.075 
Share of foreigners in total population 0.084 0.065 0.032 
Rate of economically active men 0.357 0.361 0.450 
Rate of economically active women 0.284 0.285 0.823 
Rate of economically active population 0.320 0.322 0.535 
Average number of years in apprenticeship per employee (subject 
to social insurance contribution) 14.707 14.651 0.019 
Available infant care places per infant 0.637 0.655 0.339 
Available child care places per child 0.281 0.285 0.777 
Universities per inhabitant (classified) 0.563 0.373 0.121 
Remarks: All variables measured in December 2003. FF is the discretionary budget of a local employment of-
fice. ABM denotes the number of participants in job creation schemes, SAM participants in structural adjust-
ment measures. FbW persons participating in long-term training, TM persons participating in short-term train-
ing, JUMP the number of participants in a program for the activation of young unemployed persons. FEA = 
Federal Employment Agency. ESF = European Social Fund.  
Appendix 3: Means of variables included in the propensity score specification before (first row) and after (second row) matching 
Men Women 
 Treated Controls p-value Treated Controls p-value 
Data source Propensity score 
specification 
Gender  
Male Survey 1 
   
Age   
18 to 24 years 0.185 0.194 0.423 0.229 0.250 0.056 Survey 1 
 0.186 0.188 0.841 0.229 0.234 0.684   
25 to 34 years 0.166 0.208 0.000 0.218 0.233 0.173 Survey 1 
 0.166 0.170 0.770 0.218 0.224 0.662   
35 to 44 years 0.222 0.201 0.052 0.220 0.212 0.394 Survey 1 
 0.221 0.216 0.689 0.220 0.217 0.745   
45 to 57 years 0.427 0.397 0.026 0.332 0.306 0.025 Survey 1 
 0.427 0.427 0.965 0.332 0.326 0.641   
Schooling    
Secondary general school 0.465 0.500 0.008 0.421 0.449 0.023 Survey 1 
 0.465 0.475 0.513 0.421 0.437 0.273   
Intermediate secondary school 0.303 0.264 0.002 0.386 0.350 0.003 Survey 1 
 0.302 0.294 0.588 0.386 0.375 0.422   
University entrance diploma 0.167 0.151 0.100 0.144 0.133 0.182 Survey 1 
 0.167 0.164 0.806 0.144 0.143 0.906   
Other or missing 0.066 0.084 0.010 0.049 0.068 0.002 Survey 1 
 0.066 0.066 0.962 0.049 0.045 0.598   
Migration background    
Migrant 0.244 0.260 0.174 0.248 0.258 0.379 Survey 1 
 0.245 0.247 0.886 0.248 0.256 0.512   
Household size    
1 person 0.418 0.464 0.001 0.234 0.244 0.323 Survey 1 
 0.418 0.426 0.602 0.234 0.242 0.515   
2 persons 0.203 0.182 0.045 0.353 0.342 0.351 Survey 1 
 0.203 0.199 0.736 0.353 0.349 0.774   
3 or more persons 0.379 0.354 0.049 0.414 0.414 0.965 Survey 1 
 0.379 0.375 0.800 0.414 0.410 0.776   
Number of children    
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Appendix 3: Means of variables included in the propensity score specification before (first row) and after (second row) matching 
Men Women Propensity score 
specification  Treated Controls p-value Treated Controls p-value 
Data source 
No children 0.708 0.736 0.020 0.487 0.486 0.990 Survey 1 
 0.709 0.714 0.714 0.487 0.490 0.839   
1 child 0.129 0.125 0.631 0.307 0.294 0.269 Survey 1 
 0.129 0.129 0.995 0.307 0.301 0.684   
2 or more children 0.163 0.139 0.013 0.207 0.220 0.212 Survey 1 
 0.162 0.157 0.646 0.207 0.209 0.833   
Obstacles to employment   
Disabled 0.162 0.127 0.000 0.076 0.067 0.169 Survey 1 
 0.161 0.151 0.367 0.076 0.073 0.687   
Care obligation 0.024 0.020 0.229 0.043 0.042 0.748 Survey 1 
 0.024 0.023 0.813 0.043 0.043 0.945   
Status before welfare receipt   
(Minor) employment 0.294 0.323 0.020 0.316 0.305 0.347 Survey 1 
 0.294 0.298 0.796 0.316 0.313 0.818   
Labor market history from 2001 to 2004   
12.264 12.300 0.888 9.582 8.871 0.004 Admin Number of half-months unemployed in 2004 
12.272 12.372 0.738 9.582 9.472 0.696  
1 
 
10.215 10.307 0.728 7.973 7.118 0.000 Admin Number of half-months unemployed in 2003 
10.225 10.324 0.746 7.973 7.723 0.364  
1 
 
8.105 8.059 0.856 6.093 5.532 0.009 Admin Number of half-months unemployed in 2002 
8.102 8.150 0.870 6.093 5.904 0.451  
1 
 
6.346 6.275 0.757 5.171 4.556 0.002 Admin Number of half-months unemployed in 2001 
6.345 6.366 0.937 5.171 4.868 0.196  
1 
 
17.056 19.778 0.000 23.952 28.477 0.000 Admin Number of half-months out of labor force from 
2001 to 2004 17.072 17.416 0.672 23.952 24.104 0.861  
1 
 
4.393 5.208 0.006 7.117 9.048 0.000 Admin Mean duration out of labor force from 2003 to 
2004 in half-months 4.397 4.450 0.870 7.117 6.948 0.672  
1 
 
Number of programs from 2003 to 2004 0.351 0.384 0.060 0.278 0.262 0.259 Admin 1 
 0.351 0.352 0.954 0.278 0.275 0.867   
2.351 2.322 0.845 1.973 1.730 0.075 Admin Mean duration of programs from 2003 to 2004 
in half-months 2.347 2.349 0.993 1.973 1.855 0.459  
1 
 
Current welfare spell   
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Appendix 3: Means of variables included in the propensity score specification before (first row) and after (second row) matching 
Men Women Propensity score 
specification  Treated Controls p-value Treated Controls p-value 
Data source 
Months in welfare before 10/2006 13.862 13.757 0.659 14.532 14.595 0.770 Survey 1 
 13.875 13.895 0.941 14.532 14.489 0.864   
Start after 10/2006 or missing 0.158 0.157 0.965 0.129 0.126 0.721 Survey 1 
 0.157 0.158 0.996 0.129 0.128 0.960   
Regional information   
Unemployment ratio (high) 0.250 0.223 0.017 0.282 0.231 0.000 Regional 1 
 0.250 0.245 0.724 0.282 0.256 0.037   
Urban district 0.167 0.369 0.000 0.163 0.371 0.000 Regional 1 
 0.167 0.164 0.849 0.165 0.165 0.962   
Further regional variables         
GDP per employed person (high) 0.265 0.308 0.001 0.262 0.320 0.000 Regional 2 
 0.266 0.300 0.013 0.263 0.299 0.005   
Population density (high) 0.210 0.393 0.000 0.205 0.392 0.000 Regional 2 
 0.210 0.209 0.972 0.207 0.211 0.704   
Labor market conditions above average 0.358 0.284 0.000 0.346 0.304 0.000 Regional 2 
 0.358 0.373 0.309 0.347 0.367 0.141   
Labor market conditions below average 0.331 0.388 0.000 0.336 0.382 0.000 Regional 2 
 0.331 0.338 0.612 0.339 0.350 0.395   
East Germany 0.262 0.212 0.000 0.294 0.223 0.000 Regional 2 
 0.262 0.247 0.283 0.290 0.277 0.312   
Further socio-demographic variables   
0.115 0.108 0.460 0.180 0.165 0.101 Survey At least one child aged below 3 in the house-
hold  0.114 0.113 0.869 0.180 0.164 0.139  
3 
 
Lone parent status 0.023 0.019 0.300 0.295 0.299 0.752 Survey 3 
0.023 0.021 0.753 0.295 0.296 0.947   
Born abroad 0.227 0.225 0.847 0.229 0.226 0.797 Survey 3 
0.227 0.217 0.444 0.229 0.227 0.897   
Foreign language spoken in the household 0.150 0.169 0.055 0.144 0.146 0.770 Survey 3 
0.150 0.160 0.380 0.144 0.145 0.873   
Professional qualification   
None 0.229 0.272 0.000 0.272 0.327 0.000 Survey 3 
0.230 0.249 0.138 0.272 0.300 0.027   
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Appendix 3: Means of variables included in the propensity score specification before (first row) and after (second row) matching 
Men Women Propensity score 
specification  Treated Controls p-value Treated Controls p-value 
Data source 
In-firm training 0.464 0.456 0.548 0.425 0.387 0.002 Survey 3 
0.464 0.469 0.776 0.425 0.404 0.135   
Off-the-job training 0.174 0.153 0.032 0.208 0.185 0.018 Survey 3 
0.174 0.161 0.275 0.208 0.193 0.180   
University degree 0.071 0.067 0.613 0.053 0.061 0.197 Survey 3 
0.071 0.073 0.788 0.053 0.065 0.095   
Other or missing 0.061 0.052 0.103 0.042 0.041 0.870 Survey 3 
0.062 0.048 0.055 0.042 0.039 0.548   
Self-assessment of overall state of health         
Good 0.556 0.576 0.130 0.593 0.620 0.029 Survey 3 
0.556 0.564 0.631 0.593 0.622 0.045   
Satisfactory 0.245 0.235 0.346 0.230 0.210 0.048 Survey 3 
0.245 0.240 0.704 0.230 0.211 0.098   
Poor 0.194 0.186 0.440 0.175 0.168 0.511 Survey 3 
0.194 0.193 0.921 0.175 0.166 0.444   
Missing 0.004 0.003 0.430 0.002 0.002 0.896 Survey 3 
0.004 0.003 0.551 0.002 0.002 0.892   
Impairments to health         
Gastro-intestinal diseases 0.152 0.155 0.701 0.152 0.176 0.010 Survey 3 
0.151 0.157 0.613 0.152 0.175 0.029   
Cardiovascular diseases 0.175 0.190 0.150 0.217 0.224 0.495 Survey 3 
0.175 0.199 0.054 0.217 0.222 0.699   
Rheumatism and other articular trouble 0.288 0.288 0.971 0.261 0.247 0.198 Survey 3 
0.289 0.298 0.493 0.261 0.251 0.429   
Sleep disorders 0.230 0.244 0.222 0.260 0.280 0.062 Survey 3 
0.230 0.246 0.236 0.260 0.279 0.130   
Nervous disorders 0.171 0.177 0.585 0.224 0.232 0.454 Survey 3 
0.172 0.178 0.607 0.224 0.229 0.680   
Allergies 0.173 0.168 0.608 0.252 0.272 0.077 Survey 3 
0.173 0.168 0.665 0.252 0.270 0.151   
Back complaint 0.418 0.405 0.340 0.423 0.414 0.468 Survey 3 
0.417 0.413 0.806 0.423 0.417 0.702   
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Appendix 3: Means of variables included in the propensity score specification before (first row) and after (second row) matching 
Men Women Propensity score 
specification  Treated Controls p-value Treated Controls p-value 
Data source 
Other complaints 0.048 0.045 0.583 0.040 0.037 0.437 Survey 3 
0.048 0.047 0.810 0.040 0.037 0.508   
No health problems 0.282 0.289 0.550 0.273 0.257 0.158 Survey 3 
 0.282 0.281 0.931 0.273 0.259 0.263   
Self-assessment of daily working capacity         
Less than 3 hours 0.042 0.041 0.908 0.039 0.044 0.377 Survey 3 
0.042 0.045 0.643 0.039 0.043 0.460   
3 to 6 hours 0.077 0.076 0.794 0.183 0.178 0.643 Survey 3 
0.078 0.079 0.900 0.183 0.177 0.600   
6 to 8 hours 0.131 0.124 0.437 0.235 0.223 0.232 Survey 3 
0.131 0.127 0.724 0.235 0.223 0.329   
8 or more hours 0.706 0.726 0.105 0.514 0.528 0.269 Survey 3 
0.706 0.714 0.582 0.514 0.528 0.314   
Missing 0.044 0.034 0.045 0.029 0.028 0.754 Survey 3 
 0.044 0.036 0.186 0.029 0.028 0.818   
Self-assessment of basic skills measured from 1 (= very good) to 6 (= fail); Missings are set to 3,5     
Reading and Writing (in mother tongue) 2.121 2.080 0.138 1.920 1.885 0.155 Survey 3 
2.122 2.062 0.058 1.920 1.870 0.075   
Mathematics 2.370 2.326 0.108 2.549 2.595 0.090 Survey 3 
2.369 2.301 0.026 2.549 2.560 0.737   
Emails and Internet 2.993 2.984 0.845 3.113 3.079 0.415 Survey 3 
 2.993 2.995 0.960 3.113 3.080 0.485   
Number of unemployment spells since entrance into working life       
1 0.333 0.311 0.075 0.449 0.456 0.578 Survey 3 
0.334 0.320 0.345 0.449 0.453 0.782   
2 or 3 0.374 0.379 0.717 0.357 0.344 0.259 Survey 3 
0.374 0.376 0.894 0.357 0.346 0.423   
4 or more 0.240 0.249 0.397 0.134 0.134 0.951 Survey 3 
0.239 0.245 0.683 0.134 0.134 0.994   
Missing 0.053 0.061 0.214 0.060 0.067 0.251 Survey 3 
 0.053 0.059 0.375 0.060 0.067 0.319   
Further information on the labor market history from 2001 to 2004       
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Appendix 3: Means of variables included in the propensity score specification before (first row) and after (second row) matching 
Men Women Propensity score 
specification  Treated Controls p-value Treated Controls p-value 
Data source 
Number of employment spells in 2004 0.306 0.310 0.779 0.298 0.316 0.168 Admin 3 
0.305 0.302 0.827 0.298 0.324 0.089   
Number of employment spells in 2003 0.216 0.240 0.075 0.168 0.199 0.007 Admin 3 
0.216 0.229 0.417 0.168 0.200 0.014   
Number of employment spells in 2002 0.232 0.244 0.389 0.219 0.234 0.222 Admin 3 
0.232 0.237 0.754 0.219 0.232 0.351   
Number of employment spells in 2001 0.282 0.296 0.366 0.225 0.258 0.011 Admin 3 
 0.282 0.287 0.779 0.225 0.256 0.033   
0.467 0.479 0.831 0.442 0.517 0.182 Admin Number of half-months seeking for a job while 
employed in 2004 0.467 0.451 0.809 0.442 0.490 0.438  
3 
 
0.263 0.268 0.895 0.260 0.310 0.222 Admin Number of half-months seeking for a job while 
employed in 2003 0.263 0.254 0.845 0.260 0.303 0.343  
3 
 
0.199 0.209 0.795 0.188 0.173 0.634 Admin Number of half-months seeking for a job while 
employed in 2002 0.199 0.207 0.848 0.188 0.176 0.743  
3 
 
0.143 0.151 0.820 0.169 0.147 0.472 Admin Number of half-months seeking for a job while 
employed in 2001 0.143 0.155 0.761 0.169 0.153 0.635  
3 
 
1.818 1.756 0.594 1.551 1.278 0.006 Admin Number of half-months in a program in 2004 
1.813 1.733 0.560 1.551 1.359 0.101  
3 
 
1.411 1.401 0.927 1.132 1.074 0.545 Admin Number of half-months in a program in 2003 
1.413 1.443 0.815 1.132 1.161 0.792  
3 
 
1.459 1.529 0.562 1.387 1.188 0.055 Admin Number of half-months in a program in 2002 
1.460 1.584 0.369 1.387 1.281 0.382  
3 
 
1.527 1.507 0.867 1.394 1.150 0.018 Admin Number of half-months in a program in 2001 
1.528 1.549 0.882 1.394 1.241 0.208  
3 
 
2.995 3.656 0.000 4.589 5.970 0.000 Admin Number of half-months out of labor force in 
2004 2.998 3.213 0.295 4.589 4.850 0.272  
3 
 
3.810 4.626 0.000 5.707 6.901 0.000 Admin Number of half-months out of labor force in 
2003 3.814 4.017 0.386 5.707 5.675 0.899  
3 
 
4.641 5.372 0.001 6.473 7.468 0.000 Admin Number of half-months out of labor force in 
2002 4.645 4.700 0.833 6.473 6.394 0.771  
3 
 
5.609 6.125 0.037 7.184 8.138 0.000 Admin Number of half-months out of labor force in 
2001 5.615 5.487 0.647 7.184 7.185 0.995  
3 
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Men Women 
Appendix 3: Means of variables included in the propensity score specification before (first row) and after (second row) matching 
 Treated Controls p-value Treated Controls p-value 
Data source Propensity score 
specification 
         
Observations before matching 2066 4194 2423 4603   
Observations of the matched sample 2064 4194 2423 4603   
Remarks: Treated are those individuals who are registered at decentralized welfare agencies, whereas the controls are registered at centralized welfare agencies. The p-values derive 
from t-tests on equality of means of the displayed variables for treated and controls before (first row) and after (second row) matching. Due to the common support restriction, 2 treated 
individuals in the subsample of men had to be excluded from the matching analysis. Variables marked by 1 in the final column of the table are included in the preferred specification of 
the propensity score as well as in the sensitivity analyses. Variables indicated by 2 are used for the propensity score specifications in the sensitivity analyses with additional regional 
variables. Variables marked by 3 are only included in the propensity score specification in the sensitivity analysis with all covariates.  
  
Appendix 4: Propensity score estimation 
  Men Women 
Age (reference: 25 to 34 years) 
0.0433** -0.0017 18 to 24 years 
(0.0220) (0.0199) 
0.0551*** 0.0042 35 to 44 years 
(0.0205) (0.0188) 
0.0527*** 0.0166 45 to 57 years 
(0.0184) (0.0199) 
Schooling (reference: secondary general school) 
0.0376** 0.0147 Intermediate secondary school 
(0.0171) (0.0184) 
0.0642*** 0.0440 University entrance diploma 
(0.0200) (0.0301) 
-0.0164 -0.0458* Other or missing 
(0.0231) (0.0239) 
Migration background (reference: non-migrants) 
0.0025 0.0334 Migrant 
(0.0241) (0.0262) 
Household size (reference: 2 persons) 
-0.0239 -0.0024 1 person 
(0.0175) (0.0198) 
-0.0281 0.0058 3 or more persons 
(0.0267) (0.0184) 
Number of children (reference: 1 child) 
-0.0270 -0.0224 No children 
(0.0266) (0.0188) 
0.0341 -0.0149 2 or more children 
(0.0227) (0.0181) 
Obstacles to employment 
0.0539*** 0.0416 Disabled 
(0.0179) (0.0261) 
0.0360 0.0184 Care obligation 
(0.0457) (0.0322) 
Status before welfare receipt 
-0.0254* 0.0101 (Minor) employment 
(0.0151) (0.0116) 
Labor market history from 2001 to 2004 
-0.0016* -0.0007 Number of half-months unemployed in 2004 
(0.0009) (0.0011) 
-0.0009 0.0013 Number of half-months unemployed in 2003 
(0.0009) (0.0010) 
0.0003 -0.0008 Number of half-months unemployed in 2002 
(0.0009) (0.0012) 
-0.0002 0.0005 Number of half-months unemployed in 2001 
(0.0009) (0.0010) 
-0.0008** -0.0006* Number of half-months out of labor force 
from 2001 to 2004 (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Mean duration out of labor force from 2003 to -0.0009 -0.0007 
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Appendix 4: Propensity score estimation 
  Men Women 
2004 in half-months (0.0008) (0.0006) 
-0.0238 -0.0074 Number of programs from 2003 to 2004 
(0.0157) (0.0184) 
0.0003 0.0009 Mean duration of programs from 2003 to 
2004 in half-months (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Current welfare spell 
0.0006 0.0000 Months in welfare before 10/2006 
(0.0012) (0.0012) 
0.0278 0.0208 Start after 10/2006 or missing 
(0.0247) (0.0266) 
Regional information 
0.0151 0.0427 Unemployment ratio (high) 
(0.0973) (0.1001) 
-0.2127** -0.2236** Urban district 
(0.0861) (0.0872) 
Observations 6,260 7,026 
McFadden-R2 0.047 0.046 
Log-Likelihood -3783.36 -4318.83 
Remarks: Displayed are marginal effects and standard errors in brackets. *** 
denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05 and * denotes p<0.1. 
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